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WAS JESUS MAD, BAD, OR GOD? .. 
OR MERELY MISTAKEN? 
Daniel Howard-Snyder 
A popular argument for the divinity of Jesus goes like this. Jesus claimed to 
be divine, but if his claim was false, then either he was insane (mad) or 
lying (bad), both of which are very unlikely; so, he was divine. I present 
two objections to this argument. The first, the dwindling probabilities objection, 
contends that even if we make generous probability assignments to the rele-
vant pieces of evidence for Jesus' divinity, the probability calculus tell us to 
suspend judgement on the matter. The second, and more telling objection in 
my opinion, the merely mistaken objection, contends that it is no less plausible 
to suppose that Jesus was neither mad nor bad but merely mistaken than 
that he was divine. 
Apparently some of the Church Fathers argued for the divinity of Jesus on 
the grounds that if his claim to divinity was false, then he was a bad man; 
for if he was not divine, then either he was lying about who he was or he 
was mad, neither of which is true. This argument-sometimes called the 
Mad, Bad, or God Argument, or MBG, for short-is heard from contempo-
rary Christian apologists in one form or another, perhaps most notably 
from C.S. Lewis. 
I am trying to prevent anyone from saying the really foolish thing 
that people often say about Him: "I'm ready to accept Jesus as a great 
moral teacher, but I don't accept His claim to be God." That is the one 
thing we must not say. A man who was merely a man and said the 
sort of things Jesus said would not be a great moral teacher. He 
would either be a lunatic---on a level with the man who says he is a 
poached egg---or else he would be the Devil of Hell. You must make 
your choice. Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a 
madman or something worse. You can shut Him up for a fool, you 
can spit at Him and kill Him as a demon; or you can fall at His feet 
and call Him Lord and God. But let us not come with patronising 
nonsense about His being a great human teacher. He has not left that 
open to us. He did not intend to .... 
We are faced, then, with a frightening alternative. This man we are 
talking about either was (and is) just what He said or else a lunatic, or 
something worse. Now it seems to me obvious that He was neither a 
lunatic nor a fiend: and consequently, however strange or terrifying 
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or unlikely it may seem, I have to accept the view that He was and is 
God. God has landed on this enemy-occupied world in human form.1 
In this paper, I aim to assess the MBG argument. In section I, I present a 
version of it that seems most perspicuous to me, followed by several stage-
setting remarks, including two ground rules for assessing it. In section 2, I 
present the dwindling probabilities objection, a variation on an objection 
that Alvin Plantinga uses against traditional historical arguments for the 
great truths of the gospeP In section 3, I drop the probabilistic machinery 
and grant every premise of the MBG argument but one, the premise that 
denies that Jesus was merely mistaken in his claim to divinity. I then assess 
the most compelling defenses of that denial and conclude that they fail. In 
section 4, I argue that we-or, at any rate, those who share my epistemic 
situation vis-a-vis that premise-should suspend judgment about it. 
1. The MBG Argument 
The version of the MBG argument that I am interested in is this: 
1. Jesus claimed, explicitly or implicitly, to be divine. iii 
2. Either Jesus was right or he was wrong. 
3. If he was wrong, then either 
(a.) he believed he was wrong and he was lying, or 
(b.) he did not believe he was wrong but he was institutional-
izable, or 
(c.) he did not believe he was wrong and he was not institu-
tionalizable; rather, he was merely ~istaken. 
4. He was not lying, i.e. a is false. 
5. He was not institutionalizable, i.e. b is false. 
6. He was not merely mistaken, i.e. c is false. 
7. So, he was right, i.e. Jesus was, and presumably still is, divine. 
Let me make four preliminary observations about this argument. 
First, although the argument is deductively valid, its proponents affirm 
the main premises-I, 4, 5, and 6-on probabilistic grounds. In no small 
part, these grounds have to do with the New Testament texts, especially 
their reliability vis-a-vis the claims, character, and conduct of Jesus. The 
proponents of the MBG argument wisely avoid insisting on the divine 
authority of these texts in the context of defending its premises; if one 
would have to endorse their divine authority in order to accept the prof-
fered grounds for affirming the main premises, the argument would lose 
much of its interest. And it certainly is not presented that way by its propo-
nents. Rather, its proponents insist that, on the basis of historical scholar-
ship alone, the information gleaned from the New Testament, along with 
other relevant information, makes it likely that the main premises are true. 
So, the first ground rule is this: While considering what might be offered 
on behalf of the premises of the MBG argument (and while assessing objec-
tions to them, for that matter), we are not allowed to treat the biblical texts 
as divinely authoritative. 
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Second, premise 1 assumes that Jesus existed. I take it that the probabili-
ty of this assumption, on the relevant information, is 1, or as close to 1 as to 
make no difference. I will also assume that if Jesus claimed to be divine, he 
claimed to be divine in a robust sense, one that a run-of-the-mill first-cen-
tury orthodox Jew would attribute only to God. Those familiar with dis-
cussions of the MBG argument will notice that I have just ruled out the so-
called myth and guru options.4 In doing so, I mean to display my prejudice 
that they are unworthy of serious consideration. 
Third, most proponents of the argument present it as a trilemma: mad, 
bad, or God ... Lord, liar, or lunatic. Hence the popular name of the argu-
ment, the Trilemma. My version is an explicit quadrilemma: mad, bad, God, 
or neither mad nor bad, but merely mistaken. By formulating the argu-
ment in this way I mean to display my conviction that the merely mistaken 
option has been unduly neglected by the proponents of the argument. 
Fourth, consider the following claim by Stephen Davis, a proponent of 
the argument: "the MBG argument, properly understood, can establish the 
rationality of belief in the incarnation of Jesus".s Davis does not mean to 
suggest that the MBG argument is the only or even the best argument for 
the divinity of Jesus; indeed, he does not even mean to imply that the ratio-
nality of belief in His divinity must find its source in argument at all. 
Rather, I take it, Davis means to claim that the MBG argument, properly 
understood, can be an independent and sufficient evidential basis for rational 
belief in the divinity of Jesus. What do I mean by "independent" here? I 
mean this. There are several lines of evidence that might enter into an 
assessment of the claim that Jesus was divine. His pre-resurrection mira-
cles, his fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy, and his resurrection have, 
among other things, been emphaSized by apologists. When I say that the 
MBG argument can be independent evidence for the divinity of Jesus, I 
mean that the MBG argument can be evidence for the divinity of Jesus 
absent considerations such as these. If we approach the argument in this way 
(as I shall), then we have a second ground rule for assessing it: While con-
sidering what might be offered on behalf of the premises of the MBG argu-
ment (and while assessing objections to them, for that matter), we are not 
allowed to appeal to independent evidence for Jesus' divinity. 
At the outset, let me emphaSize that even if the MBG argument fails to 
establish the rationality of belief in the divinity of Jesus, the considerations 
it points to might still playa part in a cumulative case for his divinity. In 
this paper, however, I am exclusively concerned with the argument as inde-
pendent evidence that is sufficient to establish rational belief in the divinity 
ofJesus. 
I tum now to the first objection. (Readers who have no interest in the 
probability calculus may tum directly to the second objection in section 3.) 
2. Dwindling probabilities 
Suppose that the proper way to evaluate a probabilistic case for a proposi-
tion is to apply the probability calculus to our evidence for it. In the present 
case, that would involve determining the probability of 
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D. Jesus was (is) divine, 
given our "background knowledge," which is what we take for granted, 
call it K. So the goal is to determine the probability of D given K, i.e. 
P(D /K). Toward that end, the MBG argument offers us as evidence the 
conjunction of its four main premises: 
C. Jesus claimed, explicitly or implicitly, to be divine. 
-1. He was not lying.6 
-I. He was not institutionalizable. 
-M. He was not merely mistaken. 
Let us call the conjunction of these premises X. I will assume that the 
P(D /K&x) = 1, or so close to 1 as to make no difference. This assumption 
favors the proponent of the argument since it amounts to granting that if 
the main premises are true, then Jesus was divine.7 I will also assume that 
P(D/K&-X) = 0, or so close to 0 as to make no difference. Although this 
assumption favors the critic of the argument, we must make it since to 
assume otherwise is to assume, among other things, that there is a signifi-
cant chance--say, one in a thousand-that Jesus was divine even though 
he did not claim to be, or even though he was lying, or even though he was 
institutionalizable. Given these two assumptions, the calculus tells us that 
to determine P(D / K) we just need to determine the P(X / K), and to do that, 
we just need to assign a value to each of these probabilities: 
P(C/K) 
P(-L/K&C) 
P(-I/K&C&-L) 
P( -M/K&C&-L&-I) 
To assign a value to P(X/K), the calculus tells us to multiply these four val-
ues. That is, 
P(X/K) = P(C/K)x P(-L/K&C) x P(-I/K&C&-L) x 
P(-M/K&C&-L&-I). 
Clearly enough, we cannot assign precise numerical values to these four 
probabilities; we can, however, assign rough numerical ranges which 
express that the probability of a proposition is very low, or low, or mid-
dling, or high, or very high, and the like. That is what I will do. Let us tum 
now to the first probability. 
P(C/K). What is the probability that Jesus claimed, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to be divine, given our background knowledge? Now, I am no 
expert on this matter and, unsurprisingly, the experts disagree. On one end 
of the spectrum, we have, for example, Craig Evans, who sums up a recent 
essay on Jesus' self-understanding in these words: 
... [T]he belief in the deity of Jesus appears to be rooted in his teach-
ing and activities and not simply in post-Easter ideas. This is proba-
ble, not only for reasons argued above [reasons having to do with 
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Jesus' designation of Himself as 'the son of man'], but also because 
the affirmation of Jesus as Israel's Messiah required no confession of 
his divinity. That the awaited Messiah might possess divine attribut-
es was a possibility, given what is said of him in I Enoch and his 
identification with the son of man figure in Daniel, but it was not a 
requirement. Popular expectation seems to have looked more for a 
Davidic-like figure who would drive the Romans from Israel and 
restore the kingdom along the lines of the classical period. 
Had Jesus not claimed to be Israel's awaited Messiah, it is not like-
ly that his disciples would have later said that he had. Easter alone 
would have provided no motivation to infuse the content of Jesus' 
teaching with messianism .... [Furthermore, if] Jesus allowed his dis-
ciples to think of him as Israel's Messiah, but possessing no qualities 
of divinity or special relationship to God whereby divinity might rea-
sonably be inferred, then why would the disciples introduce this ele-
ment, when conventional messianism did not require it and strict, 
Jewish monotheism would not encourage it? 
.. .In my judgement, the Gospels' presentation of Jesus' teaching 
and conduct as ultimately messianic and in places connoting divinity 
is compelling. The most plausible explanation of the Gospels as we 
have them and of the earliest Church's proclamation is that Jesus 
claimed to be Daniel's heavenly son of man figure through whom 
God would defeat his enemies and bring about the everlasting king-
dom. From this claim and from related teachings and actions the 
early Church rightly inferred Jesus' divinity .... 8 
What is important for my purposes about Evans' conclusion is not how he 
arrives at it but how he expresses it. Oversimplifying a bit, he concludes 
that Jesus probably regarded himself as divine, or that a compelling case can 
be made for this thesis, or that it is the most plausible explanation of the avail-
able data. These are not the words one would use if one thought it was vir-
tually certain or even extremely likely that Jesus believed that he was 
divine. These are the words one would use if one thought there was a lot 
going for the thesis, that it was fairly likely, that its probability was in the 
range, say, of .7-.9. 
I need not quote those who would scoff at Evans' judgement. Let's sim-
ply acknowledge that there are plenty of experts who are aware of all the 
historical material that Evans is aware of and yet who would say that the 
probability that Jesus claimed to be divine, either implicitly or explicitly, 
was virtually nil. And, of course, there are those inbetween. Let us be gen-
erous, however; let us suppose that Evans is right and that those who are 
glamorized by the popular media are wrong. Let us say that P(C/K) = .7-.9. 
P(-L/K&C}. What is the probability that Jesus was not lying, given our 
background knowledge and the proposition that he claimed, implicitly or 
explicitly, to be divine? While some readers of the Gospels are puzzled by 
some of the moral traits Jesus displays (e.g., in causing economic ruin by 
sending demons into a herd of swine or by threatening eternal punishment 
in a lake of fire), most come away with the impression that, on the whole, 
Jesus was compassionate and principled, not the sort of person who would 
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lie for personal gain. Let us say, then, that it is very likely that Jesus did not 
lie about who he was, that P(-L/K&C) = .85-.95. 
P(-I/K&C&-L). What is the probability that Jesus was not institutional-
izable, given our background knowledge and the proposition that he 
claimed to be divine and was not lying? Albert Schweitzer famously 
defended the clinical sanity of Jesus from nineteenth-century detractors by 
arguing that they relied on material from the Gospels that was unhistorical 
and that they failed to acquaint themselves with the worldview in which 
Jesus and his Jewish contemporaries were embedded. Schweitzer conclud-
ed that 
The only symptoms to be accepted as historical and possibly to be 
discussed from the psychiatric point of view-the high estimate 
which Jesus has of himself and perhaps also the hallucination at the 
baptism-fall far short of proving the existence of mental illness.9 
Winfred Overholser, past president of the American Psychiatric 
Association, agrees with Schweitzer's overall conclusion but nevertheless 
suggests that the texts that Schweitzer deems historical are consonant with 
a diagnosis of paranoid psychosis, even if, as according Schweitzer, Jesus 
did not develop ideas of injury and persecution and was able to modify his 
view of his vocation in a pragmatic and logical way.1O 
Others assume that the Gospels as they stand are historically accu-
rate, at least to the extent of revealing Jesus' character and personality, and 
then argue, for example, as practicing psychiatrist O. Quentin Hyder does, 
that the "evidences from the gospel record, though far from complete, are 
sufficient to document that Jesus' patterns of thought, speech, behavior, 
and interpersonal relationships were not those of known patterns in people 
who are mentally ill," and that "any contention that Jesus was paranoid or 
delusional simply does not fit in with present day descriptions of such psy-
chiatric disorders," and that "Jesus was not psychiatrically diagnosable as 
mentally ill"Y Of particular importance to Hyder is the fact that the 
Gospels do not portray Jesus as exhibiting any of those symptoms that 
tend to accompany mental illnesses that involve delusions of grandeur. 
Indeed, quite the opposite is true. The Jesus of the Gospels, says Hyder, 
constitutes a paradigm of mental health. 
Oddly enough, Hyder fails to mention, even in passing, textual evidence 
that works against his case. For example, the texts state that a great many 
eyewitnesses who were familiar with Jesus' teaching, activities, and repu-
tation asserted that he was "raving mad" (John 10:19) and that he was "out 
of his mind" (Mark 3: 21). These included not only members of the com-
mon populace but members of his own family. If we take the Gospels at 
face value, such testimony must enter into the balance. 
So, what should we say? Well, once more, let us be generous. Let us say 
that the probability that Jesus was not institutionalizable, given our back-
ground knowledge and the proposition that he claimed to be divine and 
was not lying, is very high; let us say that P(-I/K&C&-L) = .85-.95. 
P( -M/K&C&-L&-V. What is the probability that Jesus was not merely 
mistaken, given our background knowledge and the proposition that he 
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claimed to be divine, was not lying, and was not institutionalizable? I will 
delve into this question more deeply in sections 3 and 4. For now, howev-
er, let's grant that it is very likely that Jesus was not merely mistaken, that 
P(~M/K&C&~L&~I) = .85-.95. 
Given the above probability assignments, we are now in a position to 
determine the P(X/K). It falls within the range .43-.77. Apprised of this fact, 
should we nevertheless say that the MBG argument establishes for us the 
rationality of belief in the divinity of Jesus? Clearly not, since it would be 
arbitrary of us to affirm any point within the proffered range. Instead, we 
should profess ignorance and suspend judgment about the matter. This is 
the dwindling probabilities objection. 
No doubt proponents of the MBG argument will say that I have loaded the 
dice. I would remind them, however, that our ground rules tell us to assess 
the probabilities in question while regarding the texts only as historical 
sources of information and not as divinely authoritative. Moreover, even if 
the historical evidence for the main premises is as good as or better than the 
evidence for any comparable set of claims about any other figure in ancient 
history, it is still only historical evidence about persons, times, and events far 
removed from us. The probability ranges that I have correlated with "fairly 
high" and livery high" are generous, not stingy. If we assign values signifi-
cantly higher than these we will, in effect, be treating the historical evidence 
for the claims, conduct, and character of Jesus on a par with the historical evi-
dence for much more recent events and persons. lhat would be unwise. 
If I am even approximately right in the assignment of probability 
ranges, then the dwindling probabilities objection constitutes something 
of an obstacle to affirming the MBG argument, at least for those who think 
that the application of the probability calculus in this sort of historical con-
text is fitting and that belief in a proposition should be guided by the 
results of applying the calculus to the evidence for it. In what follows, I 
will take a much simpler and less contentious approach to assessing the 
MBG argument. 
3. The merely mistaken option: assessing the reasons against it 
Suppose we affirm that Jesus claimed to be divine, that he wasn't lying, 
and that he wasn't institutionalizable; and suppose we do this without vio-
lating our ground rules. Then everything hangs on the merely mistaken 
option. In this section, I begin my assessment of that option by evaluating 
some strategies that have been used against it. 
3.1 The subsumption strategy 
lhe first strategy attempts to subsume the merely mistaken option under 
the institutionalizable option; the former reduces to or is just a not so clev-
erly disguised instance of the latter. 
3.1.1 Merely mistaken, so mentally bad, so lunatic 
Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli say that 
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.. .if Jesus wasn't really God, then he was still a bad man, even 
though sincere. He was not morally bad (he did not deliberately 
deceive people); he was mentally bad (he was deceived himself). A 
lunatic may not be wicked, but he is not much more trustworthy 
than a liar. 12 
Put formally, the argument here is this: 
1. If Jesus was merely mistaken, then he was mentally bad. 
2. If he was mentally bad, then he was a lunatic. 
3. He was not a lunatic. 
4. So, Jesus was not merely mistaken. (1-3) 
What should we make of this argument? 
I suggest that it equivocates on the term "mentally bad". There is a 
sense in which anybody who has a false belief is mentally bad, and the 
more important the belief is, the more mentally bad one is in this sense. 
For example, early on in his career Adolf Hitler was mentally bad in this 
non-clinical sense, as we might call it. Not only did he have a false belief 
about the superiority of those of Aryan blood, this false belief-and its 
corollary, that the Jews were radically inferior-turned out to be monu-
mentally significant, leading as it did to Nazi propaganda and policy-
making that culminated in the Final Solution. And this non-clinical 
sense of the term "mentally bad" was applicable to Jesus as well, if he 
was merely mistaken. Believing you are divine when you are not is 
believing something importantly false; mistaking yourself, a mere crea-
ture, for the Creator is a profound mistake. So premise 1 is true, if we 
take "mentally bad" in this non-clinical sense. But in this non-clinical 
sense, premise 2 is false. Merely being wrong about something impor-
tant, even something as important as whether one is divine, neither 
implies nor makes it likely that one is a lunatic, insane, deranged, or oth-
erwise fit to be institutionalized. So premise 2 is false, if we understand 
"mentally bad" in the non-clinical sense. 
On the other hand, one might use the term "mentally bad" to denote 
a condition that is properly described by the terms "lunacy," "insanity," 
"derangement," and the like. If Kreeft and Tacelli mean to use this clini-
cal sense of the term "mentally bad," then premise 2 is certainly true; 
indeed, it is true by definition. But in this clinical sense of the term, 
premise 1 is false. Being mistaken about something important, even 
something as important as whether one is divine, neither implies nor 
makes it likely that one is a lunatic, insane, deranged, fit to be institu-
tionalized. Indeed, premise 1 is arguably necessarily false. It could not 
follow from Jesus' being merely mistaken that he was mentally bad, in 
the clinical sense, since to be merely mistaken is, as I have defined that 
position, to be mistaken but neither lying nor institutionalizable. 
I conclude that there is no univocal sense of the phrase "mentally bad" 
which, if used uniformly in the premises of the argument under discus-
sion, renders premises 1 and 2 both true. 
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3.1.2 Merely mistaken, so deluded, so diagnosible 
Another version of the subsumption strategy appears in the following line 
of thought:13 
1. If Jesus was merely mistaken, then he was deluded. 
2. If Jesus was deluded, then He was diagnosably psychotic, 
melancholic, manic depressive, schizophrenic, or paranoid (Le. 
he was institutionalizable). 
3. Jesus was not diagnosable in these ways (Le. he was not institu-
tionalizable ). 
4. So, Jesus was not merely mistaken. (1-3) 
Well, what should we make of this argument? 
I suggest that it equivocates on the term "deluded." The term "delu-
sion" and its cognates can be used in a colloquial sense to mean, quite sim-
ply, to suffer from false belief, or to suffer from a persistent error of percep-
tion occasioned by false belief. In this colloquial sense of the term" delusion," 
premise 1 is true. For if Jesus was merely mistaken, then he had a false 
belief. Moreover, he persistently saw himself as properly carrying out 
divine prerogatives like retracting Levitical law, forgiving sins, and insti-
tuting a way to be properly related to God; and these perceptions were 
rooted in his false belief that he was divine. So on the merely mistaken 
option, Jesus was deluded in the colloquial sense of the term. But to be 
deluded in the colloquial sense neither implies nor makes it likely that one 
is psychotic, melancholic, manic depressive, schizophrenic, or paranoid. To 
be sure, if Jesus was deluded in the colloquial sense, then his contact with 
reality was impaired. Anybody with a false a belief or a systematic misper-
ception of things has some sort of impairment that affects their contact 
with reality. But it is false that if Jesus was deluded in the colloquial sense 
of the term, then he was mentally ill, a lunatic, institutionalizable. That is, if 
the argument above uses the colloquial sense of "deluded," then premise 2 
is false. 
The term "delusion" and its cognates can be used, however, in a techni-
cal sense, a sense that, by definition, denotes a condition that almost invari-
ably accompanies psychosis, melancholia, manic depression, schizophre-
nia, and paranoia. In this clinical sense of the term, if Jesus was deluded, 
then he was mentally ill, a lunatic, institutionalizable. In the clinical sense 
of the term "deluded," premise 2 is true or, at any rate, highly likely to be 
true. But Jesus' being deluded in the clinical sense does not follow from his 
being merely mistaken. In the context of the MBG argument, to say that 
Jesus was "merely mistaken" is just to say that Jesus was mistaken but nei-
ther lying nor institutionalizable; but if he was not institutionalizable, he was 
not deluded in the clinical sense. Therefore, in the clinical sense of "delud-
ed," premise 1 is false. 
I conclude that there is no univocal sense of the term "deluded" which, 
if used uniformly in the premises of the argument under discussion, ren-
ders premises 1 and 2 both true. 
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3.2 The "what if someone you knew claimed to be divine?" strategy 
The strategy that I want to consider next can be found in C. Stephen Evans' 
endorsement of the MBG argument. He writes: 
... Jesus clearly used titles for himself that conveyed divinity. He 
called himself Lord and Son of God. He even used for himself the per-
sonal name of God, revealed by God to Moses, which was regarded 
by devout Jews as too sacred even to be pronounced. He forgave sins, 
not just sins against himself, but sins in which other people had been 
wrong, as if he had been the one offended. This makes sense only if 
all sin is regarded as an offense against God and if Jesus saw himself 
as God. 
It is not easy to grasp how profoundly shocking these claims must 
have been to his contemporaries. The best way to understand this is 
simply to imagine someone you know today making similar claims. 
Imagine a neighbor who goes around preaching that you ought to 
repent, claiming to be God, and offering to forgive your sins. You 
would almost certainly regard him as insane. If you did not think 
him insane, you would certainly find him evil, a fraud who was 
probably out for power or money or both. The fact is you would find 
it impossible to be neutral about such a person. If you believed him, 
you would become a devoted follower. If you did not believe him, 
you would be repulsed. 
This is precisely how people reacted to Jesus, and these reactions 
continue to be the only sensible ones. It makes no sense to regard 
such a man as a "simple moral teacher". Either he is who he claims to 
be or he is a lunatic or something worse than a lunatic.14 
What, exactly, is the line of thought here? 
It appears to be an argument by analogy. Consider my neighbor, an elder-
ly woman by the name of 'Florence', in the counter-to-fact situation of her 
claiming to be divine, implicitly or expliCitly. In that situation, if I did not 
regard her as divine (and, despite her many virtues, I assure you that I would 
not), I would most certainly regard her as insane or evil, and not merely mis-
taken. Similarly for Jesus. Given his claims to divinity, if I did not regard him 
as divine (I do, but suppose I didn't), I would most certainly regard him as 
insane or evil, not merely mistaken. Thus, for me to regard him as merely 
mistaken is no more sensible than it would be for me to regard Florence as 
merely mistaken-which is to say that it is not sensible at all. 
What should we make of this argument? It seems to me to be much less 
telling than it is popularly thought to be. Suppose that Jesus was possessed 
of matchless sagacity, as the proponent of the MBG argument and I both 
insist. That is, suppose that if you had gotten to know Jesus really well, you 
would have learned not only that he was possessed of "intellectual distinc-
tion," to borrow G.K. Chesterton's phrase, you would also have discovered 
that he never ever clearly displayed a moral feature that was incompatible 
with divinity. Now, either my neighbor Florence possesses such sagacity 
or she does not. Let us explore each option. Suppose I am convinced that 
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she lacks it, as in fact I am. Consequently, when I take up Evans' advice to 
imagine Florence going around preaching that I ought to repent, claiming 
to be God, and offering to forgive my sins, I imagine myself regarding her 
as morally suspect or, more likely, insane. However, when I imagine Jesus 
claiming to be divine, I imagine one whom I regard as possessed of unri-
valed sagacity making the claim, in which case when I add that he was 
mistaken, I do not imagine inferring that he is insane or evil; rather, I hold 
constant his unrivaled sagacity and imagine inferring that he is merely 
mistaken. On the other hand, suppose that I'm convinced that Florence 
possesses Christ-like sagacity. Then when I take up Evans' advice to imag-
ine her claiming to be God and the like, I imagine one whom I regard as 
possessed of "intellectual distinction" and moral flawlessness making the 
claim, in which case when I add that she is mistaken, I get the same result 
that I get with Jesus: I imagine inferring that she is merely mistaken. 
The problem with the analogy is that it holds only in the case in which 
Jesus is regarded as an ordinary human, or at least unsage-like. For the 
only case in which we would regard Jesus' claims to divinity in the way in 
which we would regard our neighbors' comparable claims-namely, as 
indicative of insanity or worse-is the case in which we regarded him as 
intellectually and morally defective in the way in which we believe they 
are. But neither I nor the proponent of the MBG argument regard Jesus in 
this way. We hold him in much greater esteem than that. When we hold 
Jesus' sagacity constant in our comparison of him with our neighbors, 
either we will regard the cases as relevantly disanalogous (he is sagacious 
and they are not), or else we will regard the cases as relevantly analogous 
(he is sagacious and they are too), in which case we will regard both him 
and them as merely mistaken. 
3.3 The sagacity strategy 
Peter Kreeft assesses the MBG argument by way of a fanciful post-mortem 
dialogue between three characters, all of whom died on the same day in 
1963: Aldous Huxley, John F. Kennedy, and C.S. Lewis. (The latter repre-
sents Kreeft's own viewpoint.) At one point, Kreeft presents the MBG 
argument like this: 
Lewis: There are only four possibilities. He Uesus] is either God, or a 
bad man (blasphemous or insane), or a good man (a mere 
sage), or an ordinary man .... And you can't classify Jesus in 
anyone of the other three categories. IS 
That's a good start. At least a variation on the merely mistaken option is on 
the table (Jesus was a good man, a mere sage). 
Our question, then, is this: exactly why can't we classify Jesus in the cat-
egory of "a good man (a mere sage)"? Kreeft's only discernible answer is 
contained in this short passage: 
Lewis: Into which of the following three classes would you put 
him? Ordinary people, sages or pseudogods? 
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Kennedy: 
Lewis: 
Kennedy: 
Sages, of course. 
No, for they do not claim to be God, and he does. 
Hmmm. Suppose we try pseudogods? 
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Lewis: No, because they lack the wisdom, compassion and 
creativity that he has. 
Kennedy: 
Lewis: 
Kennedy: 
Lewis: 
And not ordinary people, because ... 
For both reasons. There is only one possibility left. 
How can it be avoided? 
And that is? 
He is a sage, therefore to be trusted. And he claims to 
be God, therefore he is not just another human sage.16 
What reason is offered here for rejecting the merely mistaken option? I 
have two suggestions. 
3.3.1 "He is a sage, therefore to be trusted" 
My first suggestion focuses on Lewis' last speech, which suggests this 
argument: 
1. Jesus was a sage. 
2. If Jesus was a sage, then he was trustworthy. 
3. So, Jesus was trustworthy. (1,2) 
4. Jesus claimed to be divine. 
5. If Jesus was trustworthy and he claimed to be divine, then he 
was not mistaken. 
6. So, Jesus was not mistaken, and hence not merely mistaken. (3-5) 
What should we think of the argument here? 
I take it that we should be no more apt to accept premise 5 than to 
accept the proposition that if the Buddha was trustworthy and he claimed 
to be divine, then he was not mistaken, or that if Confucious was trustwor-
thy and he claimed to be divine, then he was not mistaken, etc. But surely 
these other propositions are not reasonable to accept. That's because one 
can be trustworthy on many matters of the first importance and yet be mis-
taken about other equally weighty matters. 
No doubt, many of us will insist that Jesus was not merely trustworthy, 
he was perfectly trustworthy; and, of course, if Jesus was perfectly trustwor-
thy and he claimed to be divine, then he was indeed not mistaken. If we 
modify the argument accordingly, then, in order to retain validity, we will 
need to modify it like this: 
1 *. Jesus was a perfect sage. 
2*. If Jesus was a perfect sage, then he was perfectly trustworthy. 
3*. So, Jesus was perfectly trustworthy. (1 *,2*) 
4. Jesus claimed to be divine. 
5*. If Jesus was perfectly trustworthy and he claimed to be divine, 
then he was not mistaken. 
6. So, Jesus was not mistaken, and hence not merely mistaken. (3*-5*) 
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How should we assess this argument? 
Well, first of all, notice that the phrase "perfect sage" in premise 1* 
means, in part, that one is perfectly trustworthy. Secondly, note that to be 
"perfectly trustworthy" means, in part, that one asserts only true things. 
Thus, premise 1* means, in part, that Jesus asserted only true things. But 
why should we suppose that Jesus asserted only true things? The only rea-
son I know of is this: Jesus was divine. Now, I have no gripe against those 
who wish to assert that Jesus was divine. I do it routinely when I confess 
my faith in the words of the Nicene Creed. I do, however, have a gripe 
against those who use that assertion on behalf of a premise in the MBG 
argument. 
3.3.2 "The last man in the world to suffer from that intoxication" 
My second suggestion is that the passage from Kreeft contains the follow-
ing argument: 
1. If Jesus was a sage but not divine, then he did not claim to be 
divine. 
2. Jesus claimed to be divine. 
3. So, either Jesus was not a sage or he was divine. (1,2) 
4. Jesus was a sage. 
5. So, he was divine (and hence was not merely mistaken). (3,4) 
The logic is impeccable and we are granting premise 2. Moreover, those 
considerations that (let us suppose) led us to reject the liar and lunatic 
options also lead us (let us suppose) to affirm premise 4. That leaves 
premise 1. Why should we accept it? Unfortunately, Kreeft is silent. 
We might try to fill the gap by querying whether there is something 
about sagacity that is at odds with a mere (i.e. nondivine) sage claiming to 
be divine. The suggestion is common enough. G.K. Chesterton, for exam-
ple, develops it at length when, after remarking on the subtlety and superi-
ority of Christ's intellect as portrayed in the way he expressed his moral 
teaching, he writes: 
... [T]his is the very last character that commonly goes with mere 
megalomania; especially such steep and staggering megalomania as 
might be involved in that claim [i.e. the claim to divinity]. This quali-
ty that can only be called intellectual distinction is not, of course, an 
evidence of divinity. But it is an evidence of a probable distaste for 
vulgar and vainglorious claims to divinity. A man of that sort, if he 
were only a man, would be the last man in the world to suffer from 
that intoxication by one notion from nowhere in particular, which is 
the mark of the self-deluding sensationalist in religion .... 
... If Christ was simply a human character, he really was a highly 
complex and contradictory human character. For he combined exact-
ly the two things that lie at the two extremes of human variation. He 
was exactly what the man with a delusion never is; he was wise; he 
was a good judge. What he said was always unexpected; but it was 
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always unexpectedly magnanimous and often unexpectedly moder-
ate. Take a thing like the point of the parable of the tares and the 
wheat. It has the quality that unites sanity and subtlety. It has not the 
simplicity of a madman. It has not even the simplicity of a fanatic .... 
Nothing could be less like this quality of seeing beyond and all round 
obvious things, than the condition of the egomaniac with the one sen-
sitive spot on his brain. I really do not see how these two characters 
could be convincingly combined, except in the astonishing way in 
which the creed combines them .... Divinity is great enough to be 
divine; it is great enough to call itself divine. But as humanity grows 
greater, it grows less and less likely to do so. God is God, as the 
Moslems say; but a great man knows he is not God, and the greater 
he is the better he knows itY 
Philip Schaff, the emininent historian, joins Chesterton when he asks: 
Is such an intellect-dear as the sky, bracing as the mountain air, 
sharp and penetrating as a sword, thoroughly healthy and vigorous, 
always ready and always self-possessed-liable to a radical and most 
serious delusion concerning his own character and mission?!' 
Schaff's answer: "Preposterous imagination!" C.S Lewis, in a similar vein, 
writes: 
The historical difficulty of giving for the life, sayings and influence of 
Jesus any explanation that is not harder than the Christian explana-
tion, is very great. The discrepancy between the depth and sanity and 
(let me add) shrewdness of His moral teaching and the rampant 
megalomania which must lie behind His theological teaching unless 
He is indeed God, has never been satisfactorily got over. Hence the 
non-Christian hypotheses succeed one another with the restless fertil-
ity of bewilderment.!9 
I think it is helpful to read Chesterton, Schaff, and Lewis as claiming that 
the merely mistaken option must combine two elements-first, a mistaken 
claim to divinity and, second, an unmatched sagacity-the combination of 
which is "preposterous" and "unconvincing." For as Chesterton puts it, 
"Divinity is great enough to be divine; it is great enough to call itself 
divine. But as humanity grows greater, it grows less and less likely to do 
so." The sage, of course, exemplifies humanity at its greatest; so the sage is 
"the last man in the world" to make a "vulgar and vainglorious claim to 
divinity." He is "the last man in the world to suffer from that intoxication." 
What should we make of this argument for premise I? Well, I do not 
know why we would need to impugn a mere sage with vulgarity and van-
ity just because he incorrectly claimed to be divine. Remember, we are 
assuming that the claim is fully sincere. So let us drop the rhetorical extrav-
agance, in which case we can formulate the argument crisply like this: 
la. If Jesus was a sage but not divine, then he was wise enough to 
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know that he was not divine. 
lb. If Jesus was wise enough to know that he was not divine, then 
he did not claim to be divine. 
1. So, if Jesus was a sage but not divine, then he did not claim to 
be divine. (la, 1b) 
The argument is valid and 1b is true; but 1a is no more plausible than its 
denial. Let me explain. 
or 
If Jesus was a non-divine sage, then either 
• Jesus was a non-divine sage who possessed sufficient reason to 
think he was divine, 
• Jesus was a non-divine sage who lacked sufficient reason to 
think he was divine. 
To be sure, if Jesus was a non-divine sage who lacked sufficient reason to 
think he was divine, then he would be wise enough to know that he was 
not divine. It is false, however, that if Jesus was a non-divine sage who 
possessed sufficient reason to think he was divine, then he would be wise 
enough to know that he was not divine. Indeed, quite the opposite is true. 
If Jesus was a non-divine sage who possessed sufficient reason to think he 
was divine, then his "intellectual distinction" would naturally lead him to 
think he was divine. So, premise 1a is true only if Jesus lacked sufficient 
reason to think he was divine. But why should we suppose that Jesus 
lacked sufficient reason to think he was divine? 
Kreeft and Tacelli suggest that a merely human Jesus could not have 
believed himself divine since he was a Jew and "No Jew could sincerely 
think he was God".20 What should we make of this familiar idea? Would 
Jesus' first-century orthodox Jewish theology have precluded his thinking 
that he was divine-if in fact he was not divine? Perhaps it would have, 
but, if so, I do not see why. Suppose he was who he claimed to be; suppose 
he was divine, as I believe he was (and is). In that case, he had sufficient 
reason to think he was divine. Whatever that reason was, why couldn't it, 
or something similar to it in epistemically relevant respects, be duplicated 
for one who was not divine? I don't see why it could not. But if it were 
duplicable, then a first-century orthodox Jew--€ven one as sagacious as I 
believe Jesus was-could mistakenly think he was divine. 
Here is another reason to suppose that Jesus lacked sufficient reason to 
think that he was divine, if he was ot divine sane yet: if Jesus was not 
divine yet sane, as the merely mistaken option holds, then he would 
believe that he was not omniscient; at any rate, at least he would have a 
doubt about it. But in that case, he would have a defeater for his belief in 
his own divinity, since divinity requires omniscience and omniscience is 
incompatible with doubt about omniscience. Thus, if Jesus was not divine 
yet sane, he could have no better than defeated reason for his belief in his 
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own divinity, which is hardly sufficient reason. What should we make of 
this argument?21 
My main worry about this argument is that I have to suspend judgment 
about at least one of its premises. That's because I believe that Jesus was 
the Son incarnate, and the only two models for the Incarnation that I 
understand both imply that at least one of the premises is false. Of course, 
for all I know, those two models are false; but then again, for all I know, 
one of them is correct. It would be unwise for me to defend an argument 
for the divinity of Jesus at the cost of rejecting the only two models of the 
Incarnation that I understand. So I suspend judgment. 
The two models I have in mind are the kenotic model and the two-
minds model. Kenoticism denies the premise that divinity requires omni-
science since, according to the model, Jesus was fully divine but not omni-
scient. He was, at best, omniscient; this latter property, not omniscience, is 
essential to divinity. If we adjust the argument under discussion so that it 
is compatible with kenoticism, it then has the false premise that omni-
science-unless-incarnate is incompatible with doubt about orriniscience-
unless-incarnate. According to the two-minds model, Jesus was one person 
with two minds, one of which was divine and the other of which was 
human. While the divine mind had full access to the contents and experi-
ences of the human mind, the human mind lacked access to the divine 
mind, except as the divine mind permitted it. One of the advantages of this 
model is supposed to be that it shows how one and the same person can be 
omniscient while genuinely engaging in human development, as Jesus is 
supposed to have done. Suppose that this advantage is real. Then, on the 
model and contrary to the argument under discussion, Jesus could have 
been omniscient even if he had doubts about it. 
Those who are not committed to the Incarnation will not have the rea-
son that I have for suspending judgment about the argument under discus-
sion. Perhaps, however, they will have this reason: it is false that if Jesus 
mistakenly believed that he was divine and yet was sane, then he would 
believe that he was not omniscient or at least have a doubt about it. That's 
because his reasons for believing that he was divine could have been suffi-
ciently compelling, given his cultural circumstances, that he would have 
had a doubt about it only if he had been insanely under-confident or 
pathologically skeptical, neither of which belongs to a picture of matchless 
sagacity. More judiciously, one might argue for suspension of judgment 
about the matter. For all we can say with any confidence, Jesus' reasons for 
believing that he was divine could have been sufficiently compelling, given 
his cultural circumstances, that he would have had a doubt about it only if 
he had been insanely under-confident or pathologically skeptical. I'll try to 
put more flesh on the bones of this line of thought in section 4 below. 
3.4 The "it is hard to see how" strategy 
Consider the following words from Stephen Davis: 
Perhaps Jesus claimed to be divine, was neither mad nor bad, but 
was sincerely mistaken about the matter. ... Now the defender of the 
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MBG argument will surely not want to claim that it is logically or 
even causally impossible that Jesus was sincerely mistaken in claim-
ing to be divine. If we tried hard enough, we probably could cook up 
a scenario in which a sane and moral person mistakenly took himself 
to be divine .... But it is hard to see how a sane and good person 
could be sincerely mistaken in holding the extremely bizarre belief 
that she is divine (assuming she uses the word 'divine', as Christians 
normally do in this context, i.e. as indicating a robust identity with . 
the omnipotent, omniscient, loving creator of the world). There is 
something extremely odd about the notion of a sincere, good, and 
sane person mistakenly claiming to be God.22 
The central idea here is that it is hard to see how Jesus could be sane and 
good but sincerely mistaken about who he claimed to be since, in general, 
"it is hard to see how a sane and good person could be sincerely mistaken 
in [believing] she is divine." 
Let's try to get a bit clearer about what Davis is up to here. He says that 
we are faced with a certain sort of difficulty. We have a hard time seeing 
something. From this he infers, presumably, the implausibility or improba-
bility of the merely mistaken option. But what, exactly, does Davis think we 
have a hard time seeing? A certain possibility, of course; specifically, how a 
good, sane, sincere person could mistakenly claim to be divine. But what 
sort of possibility does he have in mind? He says that he does "not want to 
claim that it is logically or even causally impossible that Jesus was sincerely 
mistaken in claiming to be divine." So he has neither physical nor logical 
possibility in mind. But then, what sort of possibility does he have in mind? 
Perhaps epistemic possibility. A proposition or state of affairs p is epis-
temically possible just in case p is consistene3 with what we take for grant-
ed (or most of us, or most of us in some specified context, e.g. most of us 
who are students of the MBG argument-I'll leave the qualification tacit 
from here on out). And, naturally enough, p is not epistemically possible 
just in case it is inconsistent with what we take for granted. Thus, the 
proposition that a sane and good person is sincerely mistaken in believing 
he is divine is epistemically possible just in case that proposition is consis-
tent with what we take for granted. And, the proposition that a sane and 
good person is sincerely mistaken in believing he is divine is not epistemi-
cally possible just in case that proposition is inconsistent with what we take 
for granted. 
Our question, then, is this: is it hard to see how it is epistemically possi-
ble for a good, sane, sincere person to mistakenly claim to be divine? Is it 
hard to see how the proposition that a good, sane, and sincere person mis-
takenly claims to be divine is consistent with what we take for granted? To 
be sure, seeing how this could be won't be like having a Cartesian "clear 
and distinct idea" about, say, the essence of body; and it won't be like dis-
cerning Locke's ''bright aura," the numinous glow that attends reflective 
attention on 2+ 1=3 and other obvious necessities. But to insist on such stan-
dards here would be unreasonable. Rather, to see how a good, sane, and 
sincere person might mistakenly claim to be divine it suffices to tell "just 
so" stories, stories that, on reflection, look to be consistent with what we 
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take for granted and lack that" cooked up" quality that Davis detests. 
4. The merely mistaken option: how it (epistemically) might have been 
The merely mistaken option, at its best, has Jesus possessing sufficient rea-
son (or, more broadly, grounds) for thinking that he was divine, or so I 
suggested above. In the present section, I will tell two "just so" stories that 
seem to have this feature. I don't claim, however, that they are likely or 
more likely than not or, for that matter, even logically possible. I claim only 
that, on reflection, they are not silly and they seem to be consistent with 
what we properly take for granted in the context of assessing the MBG 
argument. 
4.1 The Beelzebub Story 
The first story I have in mind might be called the Beelzebub Story. It's main 
plot goes like this: 
The one and only God, the almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of 
all things seen and unseen, created angels before He created humans. 
Those angels were created with astounding capacities, and both the 
power to exercise them for the sake of God's glory and their own ful-
fillment as angels, and the power to refrain from exercising them 
toward that end. A great proportion of them refrained; they spurned 
their Creator and led by Satan, the Prince of Darkness, made it their 
goal to ruin God's creatures. That goal remains intact to this day. One 
of the ways in which Satan tries to ruin God's creatures is to deceive 
human beings, to trick them into worshipping not the one, true God, 
but a mere creature. He has discovered that one of the most effective 
ways to do this is to masquerade as an angel of light, as St. Paul 
observed; but the most effective deception involves getting a man to 
masquerade as God Himself. Toward that end, Satan duplicates for a 
mere man the good grounds that a man would or might have for 
believing he was divine, if he were divine. He then does his best to 
orchestrate things so that, well, something akin to the events of the 
New Testament unfold. This, in fact, is what happened to Jesus. The 
rest is history. Satan had no idea that things would work so well. 
What should we make of this simple story? Is it consistent with what we 
take for granted? Does it shed some light on how a sane and good per-
son-in this case Jesus-could be sincerely mistaken in believing that he is 
divine? 
Well, at best, the Beelzebub Story is only of use to those who are, at a 
minimum, open to theism and the Satan tradition. I count myself as a 
member of this audience. In the present subsection (4.1), I will speak only 
to those who share this openness. In the next subsection (4.2), I will speak 
to a broader audience. 
We might object that the Beelzebub Story is inconsistent with what we 
take for granted since God would not let such a horrible thing happen. 
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Presumably, those words will make it only halfway out of our mouths. For 
although God might well impose some limits on the deceptive power of 
Satan, the way the world is strongly suggests that this isn't one of them. 
God lets some pretty horrible things happen, in general; and among them 
is letting people be deceived about matters of fundamental importance for 
a proper relationship with Him, even through no fault of their own. The 
Beelzebub Story is simply an instance of this sort. 
We might object that Satan could not duplicate for a mere man the good 
but fallible grounds that a man would or might have for believing he was 
divine if he were indeed divine. 
There are two questions here. First, what might such good grounds be 
like? Second, are they duplicable? I submit that if there are strong but falli-
ble grounds for supposing that one is divine (something that is in this 
respect like, say, sensory experience), then there is no impediment to Satan 
duplicating them in a mere man. So what might strong but fallible grounds 
for a man to believe he is divine be like? 
The Beelzebub Story can be developed to answer this question. Central 
to that development is the claim that Satan could make it look to Jesus and 
others that, e.g., Jesus raised a man from the dead and performed various 
other miracles of the sort we find in the pre-resurrection narratives. But 
perhaps that would not be good enough reason for a man to suppose that 
he was divine. Non-divine prophets, after all, could perform miracles, and 
even raise men from the dead! What more would be enough? 
Here's one suggestion, call it the What-lt's-Like Addition to the Beelzebub 
Story. There is such a thing as what it is like to be divinity incarnate, a dis-
tinctive way of experiencing the world. What it's like to be divinity incar-
nate is like what it's like to be a male person in that one could experience 
what it's like to be male, that is, have a distinctively male perspective on 
the world, and yet not be male, although if one experiences it, that is, has 
that perspective, that's adequate grounds to think that one is male. If what 
it's like to be divinity incarnate is like this, i.e. fallible but sufficient 
grounds for believing that one is divine, then, if one had it, it might well be 
sufficient reason to believe that one was divine, especially if it were backed 
up by (what appeared to be genuine but what were in fact satanically-pro-
duced) signs and wonders. I see no reason why Satan could not duplicate 
for a mere man such a perspective. 
Here's a second suggestion, call it the Abba Addition to the Beelzebub 
Story. There is such a thing as having direct, close-up experiential contact 
with God. Moreover, there is such a thing as what it would or might be like 
if God were to vouchsafe, through a series of communications and confir-
mations in the context of such intimacy, that one was divine. Of course, on 
the Beelzebub Story, God does no such thing, but He permits satanic sub-
terfuge of the relevant sort: He permits Satan, for example, to make it seem 
abundantly clear to Jesus that he enjoyed intimacy with God the Father, 
Abba; and He permits Satan to make is seem abundantly clear that, in and 
through that experience, Jesus bore a special relationship to God the 
Father, a relationship adequately expressed by the words "unique Son of 
God". Of course, this complex of experiential grounds is not infallible; one 
could have it and yet fail to be in the relationship it conveys. Nevertheless, 
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like virtually any other experiential grounds, its fallibility does not pre-
clude its being adequate grounds, especially if it were confirmed by the 
performance of "miracles," as the Beelzebub Story supposes that it was. 
A third suggestion consists in the combination of the What-It's-Like and 
Abba Additions. (A fourth adds to the combination the main lines of the 
Messianic Story sketched below.) 
Perhaps the reader will scoff at the Additions I have suggested. My 
experience has been that such a response is rooted in the thought that, as a 
matter of necessity, a sane and good man could have sufficient reason to 
believe that he is divine only ifhe is divine. Sufficient reason for believing 
in one's own divinity must be infallible. In the second part of section 3.2.2, I 
rejected two arguments for this claim and I am aware of no others that are 
more plausible than them. So I'm left wondering why we should suppose 
that sufficient reason for a sane and good man to believe that he is divine 
is, as a matter of necessity, infallible? It isn't just obvious that this is the 
case. Nor does it have the feel of something that we properly take for 
granted. So why? 
Consider the matter like this. If we suppose that sufficient reason for a 
sane and good man to believe that he is divine must be infallible, are we 
not supposing that we are very well acquainted with what it's like to be 
divinity incarnate and what, on the Christian view of things, Jesus' experi-
ence of God the Father was like? In fact, aren't we supposing that we are so 
well acquainted with this perspective and experience that we properly 
regard it as infallible? It seems so. But does anybody really think that they 
are in a position to make that judgment? Proponents of the MBG argument 
who think that they are familiar with such matters have some explaining to 
do, to say the least. 
4.2 The Messianic Story 
Here's another way to cash out the merely mistaken option, this time in a 
way that's consistent with naturalism, and hence the views of a broader 
audience than that to which the Beelzebub Story might appeal. Call it the 
Messianic Story: 
Jesus had sufficient reason, or at any rate, what counted as sufficient 
reason in first-century Palestine, to believe He was the Annoited One 
of the line of David, the King of the Jews, and, in this Davidic sense, 
the Messiah, Messiah ben David. Apparently, he wasn't alone. Plenty 
of others both before and after Jesus thought of themselves as 
Messiah, and many, many more agreed with them. When each of 
their bids to overthrow Rome failed, more candidates and their fol-
lowers were waiting in the wings. 
After Jesus came to believe he was Messiah, he continued his prac-
tice of reading the Jewish Scriptures closely, where he found hitherto 
undiscovered nuances and suggestions that led him to a fusion of 
ideas that was extraordinarily shocking. For example, he noticed that 
"the child" of Isaiah 9:6-who will be "born to us," that is, born to 
Israel, and upon whose shoulders the government will rest; the child 
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whom every Second Temple Jew regarded as Messiah-is described 
as el gibber. Jesus recognized the ambiguity-el gibber can be read 
"Mighty Warrior" as well as "Mighty God" -but he reasoned against 
the traditional view according to which it meant "Mighty Warrior". 
After all, the child is also designated, in the same verse, "Prince of 
Peace," and that title is more at odds with "Mighty Warrior" than 
"Mighty God". Moreover, this interpretation made better sense of 
"Eternal Father," which was applied to "the child" in the same verse, 
a reading the tradition had subjugated with remarks about its being 
merely honorific. No, thought Jesus; the child, the kingly Messiah, 
born to Israel, is quite literally "Mighty God" and "Eternal Father". 
But the child could not be these things unless ... (and here the shock of 
the fusion must have been great indeed) ... unless Messiah is divine. 
Once the association of Messiah and divinity had surfaced, Jesus 
saw it expressed elsewhere in the Scriptures, for example in Psalm 45. 
Although the explicit theme there is the exaltation of the particular 
king whom the psalmist is addressing, a broader theme was recog-
nizably implicit. Implicitly, thought Jesus, God was gesturing 
through the psalmist's exaltation of the king before him toward 
another king, one whose dominion really would endure, Messiah ben 
David. And how was the kingly Messiah addressed? Not only as one 
who was "set above" his "companions" among men (v.7), but also as 
one who was el gibber (v.3) and no less than God Himself (v.6). After all, 
speaking of and to the kingly Messiah the psalmist proclaims, "Your 
throne, 0 God, will last for ever and ever." To Jesus' mind, this was 
Messiah and divinity fused again. 
A third case: Jesus' contemporaries took it that no human being 
was greater than David, the greatest of earthly kings. Jesus pointed 
out, however, that David himself declared, in Psalm 110: 1, that "The 
LORD [Yahweh] said to my Lord: 'Sit at my right hand until I put 
your enemies under your feet'." David here refers to his own Lord 
[Adonai], a term which Jesus and his contemporaries took to refer to 
Messiah. And Jesus saw that in calling Messiah his own Lord, David 
implied that he was Messiah's inferior. What, then, is the best expla-
nation of the twin fact that David is inferior to Messiah and yet no 
man is greater than David? The best explanation, Jesus inferred, was 
that Messiah was no mere man; he was divine as well. Again: 
Messiah and divinity fused. 
A fourth, and final illustration. Like many of his contemporaries, 
Jesus took it that "the son of man" was commonly used in the 
Prophets to refer to Messiah. The son of man, Jesus saw in Daniel 7, 
was ushered into the presence of God Himself, the Ancient of Days, 
the Most High. But, as the LORD had told Moses: "No man shall see 
me and live" (Ex. 33:20). So the son of man, Messiah, sits on the 
LORD's throne, and doubtless sees Him; but, no human can do that. 
Apparently, the son of man was no mere man, but divine as well. 
Fusion. 
So Jesus thought that in some important sense the kingly Messiah 
was divine. But there is only one God, he reasoned. In some sense, 
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then, there is one and only one God, yet, given the fusion of Messiah 
and divinity, there was some sense in which God was plural. Was 
there any precedence for this in non-messianic texts? Of course, Jesus 
thought to himself: "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, 
in our likeness ... ' So God created man in his own image, in the image 
of God he created him" (Gen. 1:26-27). Divine plurality in divine 
unity was a well-known phenomenon in the Scriptures. 
So it was: first, Jesus came to believe he himself was Messiah ben 
David. Then, given his reading of the Jewish Scriptures, he came to 
believe that Messiah was divine. He made the natural deduction. 
That's a sketch of the Messianic Story. We might embellish it with more 
alleged textual fusions of Messiah and divinity, but the basic idea, I hope, 
is clear. What should we make of it? 
We might object to it on the grounds that it has Jesus coming to believe 
that he is Messiah without confirmation by miracles. Absent miracles, Jesus 
would have been an idiot if he believed he was Messiah. By way of 
response, while it is true that the Messianic Story does not specify how 
Jesus came to believe he was Messiah, I take it that he might well have had 
what was, in his cultural circumstances, considered to be sufficient reason 
to believe that one was Messiah without miraculous confirmation. After 
all, at the time, a lot of people claimed to be Messiah without such confir-
mation, and many thousands more believed them despite the lack of such 
confirmation. 
Perhaps the objection is not that, absent miracles, Jesus would have been 
an idiot to believe that he was Messiah, but rather that, absent miracles, 
Jesus would have been an idiot to infer his divinity from his belief that he 
was Messiah. By way of response, even if the inference to divinity would 
have been significantly more reasonable in the light of miraculous confir-
mation, such confirmation does not seem necessary. At any rate, if I took it 
for granted, along with my peers, that the Old Testament was divinely 
authoritative, then, if I became convinced that I was Messiah and then, 
later, saw many of those texts fuse Messiah and divinity in the way depict-
ed by the Messianic Story, I would think that I had superlative grounds to 
suppose that I was divine-especially if my interpretive skills had been 
repeatedly confirmed since my youth by acknowledged experts. Why 
would I need more evidence in those cultural circumstances? 
5. Conclusion 
Proponents of the MBG argument contend that the MBG argument, prop-
erly understood, can establish the rationality of belief in the divinity of 
Jesus. I suspect that their contention is false. Perhaps a bit more circum-
spectly, it does not establish for me the rationality of belief in our Lord's 
divinity, and I am fairly sure that this is not due to a failure on my part to 
understand the argument properly. I understand it at least as well as its 
contemporary advocates, and yet it fails to establish the rationality of belief 
in Jesus' divinity for me. 
lt is important to remember the role of my just-so stories in my assess-
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ment of the MBG argument. I have not argued that they give us good rea-
son to think that the merely mistaken option is true, likely to be true, more 
likely than the God option, or any thing of the kind. Neither story is more 
than a bit of imaginative speculation. Rather, my contention is this: even if 
we know with certainty all the other premises of the MBG argument, it can 
establish for us the rationality of belief in the divinity of Jesus only if, given 
ground rules, we are in a position to say that the merely mistaken option is 
significantly less likely or plausible than the God option. But we are in such 
a position only if, given the ground rules, we are in a position to say that 
competing options like the Beelzebub Story and the Messianic Story are 
significantly less likely or plausible than the God option. My contention is 
that we are in no such position. At any rate, I know that I am not. When I 
hold fast to the ground rules-suspending, as it were, my belief in the 
divine authority of the New Testament record and my belief in our Lord's 
miracles and His bodily resurrection from the dead, among other such 
things-the position I am in is characterized by doubt whether the God 
option is more likely or plausible than the merely mistaken option. No one 
in my position can go on to say that the MBG argument is sufficient to 
establish for them the rationality of belief in the divinity of Jesus, our Lord. 
Western Washington University 
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